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Low TURNOUT
IN AMERICAN
ELECTIONS
BY DAVID HILL
"Ifpeople don't come out to the ballpark,
nobody's gonna stop them"

One aspect of the election, however, was remarkably similar to past elections. As with every presidential election since
1972 only about half of the eligible citizens actually cast a
ballot. While final vote totals have yet to be confirmed by
the Federal Election Commission, most estimates indicate
turnout nationwide was somewhere between 50 and 52%,
which is a modest increase over the 49% rate in 1996 (the
lowest since 1924) . While turnout indeed increased, this by
no means suggests American democracy is on the mend.
2000 is simply another in a long line of low turnout elections
since 1972. Given the closeness of the election, the low
turnout is surprising. With so much in the balance and the
intense focus of the media on the closeness of the election
one would expect citizens to show up and participate in
order to make a difference. Once again, however, students
of political participation are left asking, why is turnout in
American elections so low?
In order to understand participation rates in the United
States one must compare our turnout with that of other
comparable democracies (See Figure 1) . Between 1960 and
1995 turnout in 24 democracies without mandatory voting
averaged 80% . Ten of these 24 states had turnout rates ranging between 85% and 90% . Turnout in the United States
over the same period, on the other hand, averaged 54%
(in American midterm elections the average turnout rate
is below 40% ). Clearly, American turnout is very low when
compared to other industrialized democracies. Why?
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he 2000 presidential election was one of the most remarkable
elections in the history of the United States. The election was
decided by 53 7 votes, the margin of victory (disputed of
course) in the state of Florida. In fact, the outcome of the
election was not known until 36 days later when the Supreme
Court ruled in Bush v. Gore that vote totals certified by the
Florida Secretary of State were, in effect, final. In reality, we
will never know with certainty which candidate actually won
the election. George Bush won the Electoral College by two
votes based upon the disputed Florida vote, and Al Gore won
the popular vote by roughly 550,000 votes (one-half of one
percent), which is simply too close to call. One can be sure
that the inadequacies of the Florida electoral system exist in
almost all states (30,000 votes on ballot initiatives were initially overlooked in Boston and a substantial proportion of
under and overvotes have now been identified in Chicago).
Because of this, all we can really say with confidence about
the election is that it was a dead heat.
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Average Turnout In Selected Countries, 1960-1995
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As we teach our students, gaining understanding of a complex world requires complex answers. The low turnout in
American elections cannot be explained with one powerful
variable that can then be manipulated to rectify the problem.
Much of the answer instead lies in the structure and nature
of American government and electoral politics. Rather than
creating an environment conducive to participation, the
institutional arrangements that govern participation, representation, and actual governance create an environment that
discourages widespread participation.
For instance, one of the central differences in electoral participation between the United States and other industrialized
democracies is that we make registering to vote voluntary.
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If an individual wishes to vote in an election, that citizen
must first place his or her name on the list of registered voters. Contrast this to the system of automatic registration used
in almost all-European democracies in which the citizen's
name is automatically placed on the voter list upon reaching
voting age. In effect, we increase the costs of participation by
adding the registration requirement and thereby making the
relatively simple of act of voting a two-step process.
The individual registration requirement has a particularly
strong impact on those least likely to participate such as the
young and those oflower socio-economic status. With the
responsibility for registration placed on the individual those
most likely to participate (higher levels of education, income,
and older individuals) are the ones most likely to register to
vote. These individuals place their names on the registratiDn
rolls because they want to vote. Individuals who may lack
resources or attitudes conducive to participation (or both)
have very little ability or incentive to overcome the obstacle
of registration. When election time comes around individuals who are registered are allowed to vote while the unregistered are not. This is in part why the voting population in the
United States is skewed toward the middle and upper classes
and older Americans.
Most students of participation agree that the implementation of automatic registration in the United States would
increase overall turnout by approximately ten percentage
points, while also modestly reducing the skew toward the
advantaged. However, reform of this magnitude would
still leave turnout as much as 16 points lower than the
average turnout in other democracies. While restrictive
registration requirements are a significant depressant of
turnout they cannot completely explain the lower turnout.
We must therefore look for other factors that can help
explain the difference.
The nature of tl1e party system in the United States also
works to constrain participation. One of the key differences
in the political system of the United States and other industrialized democracies is that the United States is a two-party
system in its purest form. On Election Day, American citizens
have a choice between two centrist parties with a legitimate
chance to gain a place in government. Contrast this to
nations with proportional representation systems in which
voters usually have a choice between several parties with a
legitimate chance to gain seats in tl1e legislative body. In the
United States individuals whose ideological preferences lie to
tl1e left or right must either choose the party closest to their
preferences (as many do) or not vote at all. While to some
voting may be a habit or a reaffirmation of the political system, most citizens cast a ballot in an election hoping to gain
a voice in the government. In a two-party system like the
United States many individuals see very few differences
between the two major parties and simply cannot make a
choice between what some have characterized as two sides of
the same coin. Faced with this dilemma many citizens simply
choose to abstain from voting altogether.
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The two-party system in the United States is a natural
function of the structures of American electoral politics. The
United States' electoral system is based on single-member,
winner-take-all districts, which means that our system of
representation is based on one representative per geographic
district. In any single-member district election the winner
of the election gets to participate in government, and the losing side must wait until anotl1er day. This type of electoral
system tends to suppress the formation of minor parties for
two main reasons. First, rather than expend valuable political
resources on fighting a losing battle, most politicians will join
one of the two main parties closest to their policy preferences. Second, citizens seeking a voice in government do not
wish to expend their valuable vote (they only have one) on a
losing candidate so they too choose the major party closest to
their policy preferences rather than cast a ballot for a minor
party. Thus, the structure of electoral politics (i.e. single
member districts) constrains the number of choices voters
have at the polling place.
Single-member districts also shape mobilization efforts
by the parties and their candidates. This is important because
when the parties and their candidates expend resources to
reach out to voters they make the act of voting easier tl1rough
increased visibility, the provision of information, or even a
ride to the voting precinct. More importantly when a party
or candidate contacts a citizen or reaches out to a particular
group they are telling citizens "your vote matters." As one
political scientist has argued: "people will vote when they
are asked."
The problem lies in tl1e fact that strategic candidates
(those that seek to maximize their chances of winning) must
expend their resources where they will have the most effect
and that is in competitive races. Thus, in competitive elections the parties and candidates expend resources reaching
out to potential voters in an attempt to win. In non-competitive races, on the other hand, voters are left to their own
devices to make sense of the campaign and to participate.
Across the nation, tl1en, our single-member district elections
tend to produce uneven mobilization efforts leaving many
citizens behind.
A good example of how single-member districts influence
mobilization efforts is the Electoral College. All states, with
the exceptions of Maine and Nebraska, award all of their
electoral votes to the winner of the presidential contest in
the state, and thus candidates must focus on building an
Electoral College majority by winning enough states to reach
the required 270 votes needed to win the presidency. Some
have argued that the strength of the Electoral College is that it
forces the candidates to pay attention to small states because
they may need one or a few of these states to win. The logic
behind this is very strong. For instance, by simply giving New
Hampshire to Gore rather than Bush, the outcome of the
election would be different. This argument, while logical,

4

ignores the fundamental premise of campaigning. Use your
resources where they are needed most, which as mentioned is
in the most competitive electoral contexts. Candidates may
focus on a small state if that state is highly competitive but
only when such an effort does not detract from campaigning
in a larger state which is also competitive. After all, where
does it make sense to spend money: in Maine, which is competitive and has four electoral votes, or Florida, which is competitive and has 25 electoral votes? In the end, the name of
the game is winning 270 electoral votes and the candidates
will not expend resources to win a handful of electoral votes.
They simply have no incentive to visit or spend money in
those states that do not have much to offer in the way of
electoral votes.
A brief analysis of campaign visits to states by the two
major campaigns provides an example of how the Electoral
College forces the two major campaigns to focus on the most
competitive states. For instance, in the 2000 campaign 15
states were not visited at all by the presidential and vice-presidential candidates of the two major parties. Not surprisingly,
the average number of electoral votes for these states is a little
less than six. The two major campaign organizations had no
incentive to expend resources visiting states that provided little in the way of building an Electoral College majority. This
is not to say within this environment that the candidates will
focus their energy completely on those states with the most
electoral votes. New York and Texas, for example, have the 2"d
and 3'd most Electoral College votes respectively, yet neither
state received any serious attention from the two major
campaigns because they were not competitive. Where tl1e
campaigns did focus their energy and resources was in the
most competitive states. For example, between Labor Day
and Election Day (November 7) there were 264 total campaign visits to 35 states (and the District of Columbia) by
the two major presidential campaigns. Of tl1ese 264 visits
208, or 79%, were to the 16 so-called battleground states
(ilie most competitive). (See Figure 2) Clearly, the two major
campaigns were focusing their energy and resources where
they could help iliem the most in attempting to win tl1e
White House.
Campaign Visits by the Two Major Campaigns In the 2000
Presidential Election

300
250

_•v~

208

200 150
100
50

-

56

I
Total Visits

I
Non-Battleground

Battleground

If mobilization matters in increasing turnout we would
expect turnout to be higher in the battleground states
because of the greater mobilization attempts on tl1e part of
the major campaigns. (See Figure 3). The average of turnout
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in battleground states this past election was 56%. In nonbattleground the average level of turnout was 51 %. In fact,
turnout in the 16 battleground states increased from 53% in
1996 to 56% in 2000, while in the non-battleground states
turnout remained unchanged between these two elections.
It appears that ilie intense attention paid to the battleground
states by the two major campaigns resulted in higher levels
of turnout.
The point here is iliat the Electoral College, a constitutionally mandated feature of the American political system,
creates an electoral context in which politicians are forced
to focus their resources where iliey will do the most good,
and citizens in the rest of the country are left to fend for
themselves. Voting is much more likely when everyday
people are aware of where the candidates stand. In the sixteen
battleground states one can hazard a guess to say any
citizen who was marginally engaged with the political world
was at least minimally aware of where Bush and Gore stood,
or they were at least exposed (relentlessly) to campaign ads
and mailings. Citizens in the remaining 34 states (and the
District of Columbia) were left to their own devices to decipher where ilie candidates stood and, as would be expected,
turnout was lower.
The final institutional culprit responsible for contributing
to tl1e low turnout rates in the United States is the central
feature of the structure of government created by the Constitution: the separation of powers. The notion that the government should be divided into three individual branches
(legislative, executive, and judicial) has a long philosophical
history and is, in fact, deeply ingrained into the American
psyche. Most states mandate that college students take government courses developed around iliis structure and many
citizens equate this form of government with democracy
itself. The key argument in support of ilie separation of powers is that it provides stability ilirough incremental decision
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making. And indeed, across the history of our nation, with
the exception of the Civil War, the constitutional arrangements have provided political stability.
Unfortunately, a by-product of this stability is a fragmentation of power and the blurring of accountability. Citizens
tend to cast ballots in an election in order choose leaders who
will then pursue some broad ideological agenda or at least
policy preferences similar to their own. In a sense citizens
vote because they want a say in governmental outputs. In
nations where the main policymaking power is divided
between the legislative and executive branches there is a
reduction in the ability of the government to produce substantive policy and also a reduction in the ability of citizens
to either assess credit or blame for governmental outputs. A
citizen's inability to clearly determine what the government
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has produced creates the perception that elections have very
little chance of affecting policy outputs. Thus many citizens
drop out of the political arena because they come to believe
that elections simply don't matter. In fact, across 29 democracies turnout is lower in those countries with separation of
powers systems than those with parliamentary systems.
Further, one of the enduring characteristics of the
American political system in the post-war era is divided
government in which control of the legislative and executive
branch is divided between the Democratic and Republican
parties. In these periods (34 of the last 48 years) policy is even
more difficult to craft, accountability is completely blurred
and many citizens are left angry and confused. Across time,
then, turnout should decrease during these periods as many
citizens come to believe that their vote doesn't matter because
government has not dealt with the problems facing the
nation . One scholar has estimated that since 1840 for every
presidential election held under divided government (this
means four previous years of divided control), there is on
average a 2% decrease in turnout. We may gain stability
tl1rough the separation of powers, but we do so at the
expense of widespread participation.
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The question of why turnout is so low in American elections is fairly easy to answer. The institutional arrangements
(electoral and governmental) in our nation create an environment which is not conducive to widespread participation.
For those who believe that increased participation in electoral politics is a worthwhile goal, the central question then,
is how do we increase turnout in the United States?
Without a complete restructuring of the constitutional
arrangements of governmental and electoral politics, singlemember districts, the Electoral College, and the separation of
powers will be with us for some time to come. Given the difficulty of changing institutional structures, we are left with
reforming tl1e laws that regulate citizen access to the voting
booth, such as registration requirements at the state level.
Many states have experimented with various reforms aimed
at increasing participation in elections. North Dakota for
instance comes closest to automatic registration with no
registration requirement at all. On Election Day citizens
can simply show up and vote. Six states (Idaho, Maine,
Minnesota, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Wyoming)
have election-day registration, in which citizens wishing to
cast a ballot in an election can show up at the polling place
and register before they vote. With registration systems that
are very accessible these seven states have turnout rates
substantially higher than the rest of the nation . Since 1980
average turnout in these states is 10 points higher than states
with more restrictive registration systems.
The success of election-day registration is fairly easy to
explain. In states without election-day registration, citizens
must place their name on the registration list a specified
period of time prior to the election. Most states have a thirtyday "closing date" (Massachusetts is twenty days) after which
citizens are not allowed to register and thus not allowed to
vote. Closing dates can have a depressive effect on turnout
because the height of intensity and publicity of a campaign
takes place during the last thirty days prior to the election. In
those states with long closing dates, then, the state is cutting
off access to the voting booth just as the campaign has the
greatest potential to mobilize potential voters. Contrast this
to election-day states (and North Dakota) in which citizens
can simply show up on Election Day to register and cast a
ballot. The opportunity to register on Election Day can have
a particularly strong effect on marginal voters who may not
become engaged with the campaign until the last couple of
weeks prior to the election. In election-day states a citizen
mobilized by tl1e politicized environment of the campaign
can simply show up, register, and vote. If we want to increase
turnout in American elections implementing election-day
registration on a national scale is simply the easiest and most
effective way to do this. In fact, the reform has been proposed
to Congress several times since 1978, but each time it has
been defeated.
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The most well known registration reform in recent years is
the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) more commonly known as "motor voter." The reform is a federal mandate that requires all states without election-day registration
(or North Dakota) to allow citizens to register to vote (or
update their registration) at drivers license bureaus, through
the mail, or at public agencies such as AFDC, disability, or
unemployment offices. The logic of the reform is fairly
straightforward. By placing the opportunity to register in
front of as many people as possible, the registered electorate
should expand and by extension overall turnout rates should
increase. Since the implementation of the law in 1995 the
registered electorate has expanded, and it appears the proportion of individuals from low participation groups such
as the young, the poor, and racial minorities has increased
among the registered electorate. In the two elections since,
however, ( 1996 and 1998; the 2000 election data are not yet
available) it does not appear that individuals who are registering via the reform are voting once registered.
As mentioned, voting in the United States is a two step
process in which the potential voter is required to register
before he or she is allowed to vote in an election. The NVRA
addresses the first step in the process and at this point
appears to have been successful at creating a more representative registered electorate. However, the reform does nothing to motivate the newly registered citizen to vote in the next
election. Whatever individual level obstacles, such as socioeconomic resources or personal attitudes, that existed prior
to registration still stand between the citizen and the voting
booth. The NVRA is a positive step in the direction of creating a more equitable electoral politics; however registration
reforms such as the NVRA only open the door to the voting
booth a little wider. They do nothing to help the person
through that door.
There are other reforms aimed at increasing participation
either being implemented or at least part of the reform
debate. For instance, Oregon conducted the 2000 election
completely through the mail, and Arizona ran a limited
experiment with Internet voting in 2000. Some have argued
that by making election-day a holiday (or at least combining
it with an existing holiday such as Veteran's Day) we can
increase turnout because 1) people will have time to vote, and
2) it would make choosing our government a celebration
rather than something we do the first Tuesday after the first
Monday in November. Another reform with some merit is
the suggestion that we hold elections over the course of a
weekend. This way citizens can vote at their convenience
rather than having to squeeze it into their busy schedules
between specific hours on a particular day.
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While the impact of any reform aimed at making registration and voting easier is likely to be limited due to the institutional constraints inherent to the American system, they are
nonetheless worthwhile efforts at creating a healthier democracy through widespread participation. Some have argued
that government works best when only the most informed
and engaged citizens participate in the political process.
Indeed, the structures of government in the United States
are based on the belief that widespread participation should
be limited to prevent tyranny imposed by an uniformed
majority. There is another side to this debate, however.
Participation is a matter of voice, or having a true say in the
choosing of governmental leaders who may craft policy
which has a dramatic impact upon your life. Widespread participation creates greater democratic legitimacy because all
groups in the polity have a say in choosing elected officials.
The presidential election of 2000 was one of the most
remarkable elections in the history of this nation. However,
when we clear away media hype surrounding lawyers, pundits, and state and federal Supreme Court rulings we are left
with an election in which a little more than half of the eligible
voting population cast ballots. Are the citizens of the United
States that much more lazy and ignorant than citizens in
other nations? Most comparative public opinion work suggests An1ericans are as engaged and knowledgeable (if not
more so) than citizens in other industrialized democracies.
Is the problem, as Jim Hightower put it, that the 2000 election was a choice between "Miller Lite and Bud Lite .. .either
way you end up with mighty weak beer?" The lack of substantive differences between the two major parties is certainly
a good part of the turnout problem; however, this is only a
symptom of a larger problem. What I have tried to do here is
place American turnout in a larger perspective. Electoral
politics takes place within an institutional context and in the
United States the institutions that govern our electoral and
governmental politics work to depress participation in elections. Will turnout in American elections ever reach that of
European elections? No, not as long as the current rules of
the game are in place. Can electoral politics in the United
States be improved? Certainly, all of the reforms discussed
here are positive steps toward creating a more inclusive
democracy in which citizens come to believe they have true
voice in government.

David Hill is Assistant Professor ofPolitical Science.
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